The post-revolutionary state in Iran is an intriguingly complex political system. Constituted of a series of composite institutional arrangements with competing roles, the Iranian state is a hybrid of both democratic and theocratic institutions. Presidential elections, however constrained by the theocratic components of the political system, determine who will seize the halls of power. Since 2013, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani—who has much more in common with the reformists than the conservatives—won elections twice. During both elections, his campaign ran on the platform of “prudent moderation and hope.”
To be sure, Hassan Rouhani succeeded in delivering some of his promises to the nation. He forged the landmark nuclear deal with the West and managed to jump-start a significant economic recovery in Iran by dismantling some of his predecessor’s ill-advised populist economic policies and adopting a slew of new economic strategies. As a result, from a negative growth rate of -6.6% in 2012, Iran’s GDP grew by 7.2% in 2016 and by 12.5% in 2017. While the growth rates have been mostly the result of a massive increase in oil and gas production by a staggering 62% due to sanctions relief, they push Iran to the front ranks of the developing world in terms of GDP growth. But if the Rouhani government succeeded in restoring growth and reducing inflation from 35% to 10%, why did a widespread wave of protests, fueled by economic hardships and especially youth unemployment, sweep over Iran?